Here's a new paper with Dr David Ramsey, which we've submitted to a journal recently.
We develop a job search model based on two character measures. One measure describes the `attractiveness' of an individual or position. It is assumed that preferences are common according to this measure: i.e. each employer prefers highly attractive job seekers and all employers agree as to which job seekers are attractive. Preferences are homotypic with respect to the second measure, referred to as `character' i.e. all job seekers prefer jobs of a similar character. It is assumed that attractiveness is easy to measure and observable with certainty, but in order to observe the character of a prospective employee or position, it is necessary to interview. Hence, on receiving an application from a prospective employee, an individual employer must decide whether to interview them to gauge their suitability for the position. Job matching only occurs after an interview. During the interview phase of the process, the employer and job searcher observe each other's character, and then decide whether to make a job offer or accept a job offer, respectively. It is assumed that mutual acceptance is required for employment to occur. This paper presents a model of the job search process, and gives a procedure for finding a Nash equilibrium, which satisfies a set of criteria based on the concept of subgame perfection. Two examples are presented, and it is shown that multiple equilibria may exist. Further work will concentrate on simulating this process for realistic parameters.
Right Click the link below to download the paper.